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STATEMENT OF CLARK M. CLIFFORD 
TO 
.THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
yviTH REFERENCE TO JOINT RESOLUTION 77 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 
I appreciate your gracious invitation to appear before this 
Committee to present my views on Senate Joint Resolution No . 77 , the 
proposed constitutional amendment providing for a single six-year 
presidential term. In the most direct sense , constitutional limits on 
a President's tenure in office affect both the character and the power of 
the presidency and thus are of pivotal importance to our entire system of 
government . 
Let me state at the outset that the current controversy 
centering around the war-making power and the respective responsibilities 
·.of the Executive and the Congress in committing our military forces should 
have nothing to do with the issue of constitutional change in our form of 
government . I continue to favor a strong and vital presidency just as I 
favor a strong and effective Congress and a strong and independent 
judiciary. Those who created our Constitution wisely provided for a 
separation of powers as among the three branches of government but with 
equal wisdom they sought to ensure and protect the power of each branch , 
including the presidency . It is , I believe , the special obligation of the 
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Congress and of an informed public to preserve the basic constitutional 
structure that has served us well since 1787 . 
The need for a strong presidency can , in my opinion, be 
clearly documented from our history . The men who have been able to 
move our country forward , to hold it together in the face of the most 
critical social, economic and international crises have been strong, 
active and innovative . They have been men who knew how to stretch the 
resources of the presidency in seeking to bring about social change and 
reform . They have been men who enjoyed both political battle and the 
responsibilities of party leadership. They have embodied in their persons 
and in their time the visions and the hopes of the American people . 
We should not, of course, consider the provisions of the 
Constitution with respect to the election and tenure of our governing 
officials as sacrosanct and beyond review. Not even the original clauses 
·relating to the election of United States Senators have been treated as 
immutable . The Seventeenth Amendment revised them drastically, in the 
interests of full popular participation in the election process. But in any 
reexamination, and even more in any revision, we should be sure that 
any basic changes are in the interests of a political system that will 
provide the most able and the most responsive leadership. 
As I see it, the work of this Subcommittee , both in this 
present set of hearings and in its review of proposed constitutional 
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changes over the past few years , is work of cardinal importance and 
work that has bee n done with i magination and responsibility . I was 
therefore pleased , but not surprised , at the Chai rman ' s s uggestion 
tha t my tes timony need not be confined to Senate Joint Reso lution 77 
but would a l so be welcome on t he general subject of rest rictions on 
presidentia l terms , such as that presently embodied i n the Twenty-
Second Amendment. I therefore propose to address myself to this i ssue 
as well. 
As the Committee i s well aware , the concept of a single 
presidential term with ree lection precluded has attracted adherents 
throughout our history . Many of the participants in the Constitutional 
Convention strongly advocated a single t erm . Between 1789 and 1947 , 
when the Twenty-Second Amendment was approved by Congress ,a t l east 
270 resolutions -Nere introduced in the Senate and the House to l imi t 
· eligibility for reelection . Proponents of a fixed s ingle term have included 
severa l of our Presidents , among whom were Jefferson , Jackson , Hayes , 
Cleveland and Taft . At one time or another , men of such diverse views 
as William Jennings Bryan , Horace Greel ey , Everett Dirksen , Emanuel 
Celler and the present Majority Leader , Senator Mike Mansfield , have 
expressed support for a single term for Presidents . The notion was 
embraced in the Democratic Party Platform of 19 12 . It continues to enjoy 
substantial and distinguishe d support today in the Senate , among 
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newspaper columnists and among former White House a ides . A former 
close adviser of President Frank lin Roosevelt, Rexford Tugwell , has 
propo sed tha t we elect our President s for a single nine-year term 
subj ect only to the ability of a President to s ecure a 40% approva l 
rating in a referendum a t the end of his third year. 
As .I understand the support for restrictions on a President's 
right to stand for reelection, it derives from two basic motivations. The 
first is the continuing apprehension that a chief execut ive may find some 
mea ns to perpetuate himself in power and thus assume the role of a dictator 
to the destruction of our liberties. This , it seems clear, was the motivating 
drive and political argument that led to the passage of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment in the aftermath of Franklin Roose'!elt' s e lection for four 
consecutive terms. As I will develop further, I regard this as an unfounded 
fear in view of the constitutional distribution of powers and the certainty 
tha t a strong Congress and an informed electorate could and would protect 
themselves from any executive abuse . 
The second argument is that a single presidentia l t erm without 
the possibility of reelection would free the President from political and 
pa rtisa n considerations and would enable hi m to devote his full energies 
to our vital concems in the fields of national security, economic and social 
progress and improvement in the quality of life. Senator 1\iken of Vermont , 
which state he also served as Governor , has observed that "within months 
after an e lected President takes office , he is under attack not only by 
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those who never wanted him to be President in the first place but also 
by those who may have voted for him but find themselves neglected in 
the distribution of the politica l spoils or upset by their i nability to make 
decisions for him which coincide with their own philosophies ... A 
major purpose behind the attacks on the President is to put him in such 
a bad light that he cannot hope for reelection . .. " The contention is that 
a single term would discourage such harassment and free the President 
from the millstone of parti san politics . 
As I understand the selection of six years as the preferred 
term under Senate Joint Resolution 77 1 it is intended to balance the desira-
bility o f some continuity against the chance that a President might early in 
a longer term lose the po~Jular support necessary to the development and 
i mplementation of his programs, Perhaps a subsidiary consideration is 
that the demands on our Presidents today are so complex and exhausting 
·that no one should be required to accept election for a period greater than 
six years . 
I disagree with the reasoning offered in support of Joint 
Resolution 77 1 and ~be s!rongly opposed to i ts adoption . 
fagree with former President \A.Toodrow Wilson ' s reasons for 
his opposition to single four or six-year terms : "Four years is too long a 
term for a President who is not the true spo:(8::>mar. of the people I who is 
imposed upon and does not lead. It is too short a term for a President who 
is doing I .or attempting a great work of reform , and who has not had time 
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to finish it . To change the term to six years would be to increase the 
likelihood of its being too long, without any assurance that it would, in 
happy cases , be long enough." 
In essence, the ideal held out in Resolution 77 is a 
President with adequate time to see his major programs through and able 
to give his undivided attention to the national welfare without being diverted 
by political considerations , including those which derive from his quite 
human interest in reelection. 
It is difficult , Mr. Chairman, to disagree with these objecti,•es 
of ridding a President of both unfair political attack and undue political 
pressures. But on analysis, and based on the personal experience which 
it has been my privilege to obtain through associat.ion with several American 
Presidents , I find the notion that o. President should be above politics 
inconsistent with our system of government, just as I find the prospect of 
a presidential dictator to be inconceivable under that same system . 
Let me deal first with the argull)ent that strict limits on the 
number of years a President may serve is necessary to protect against 
excessive president.ial power. Viewed from that standpoint, the effect 
of Senate Joint Re solution 77 would be to cut the maximum pre sidential 
term from a tradition of eight years to one of six years. I recognize 
that under the Twenty-Second Amendment a maximum te nure of ten years 
would be possible if a Pre sident w e re to die in office and his Vice Preside nt 
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were thereafter to be elected for two terms . But whether viewed as a 
two or a four-year constriction of the present limit on presiclential 
service, I regard the proposed Amendment as completely unnecessary and 
thoroughly undesirable . I believe we denigrate ourselves as an enlightened 
people, and our politica l process as a whole , in imposing on ourselves 
still further disability to retain tested and trusted leadership . The 
Congress and the judiciary are now , and will remain, free to utilize 
their own countervailing constitutional power to forestall any executive 
overreaching . And I see no reason to apprehend that a President will act 
less wise ly , or less discreetly , in his seventh or ninth year in office than 
h e does i n his first six years . 
Alexander Hamilton appropriately noted : "How unwise 
must be every such self-denying o rdinance as serves t o prohibit a nation 
fro m making use of it s own citizens , in the manner best suited to its 
exigencies and circumstances." Surely we should not amend our 
Constitution to deny ourselves th e opportunity to e l ect the best man in 
a time of great need. With the rapidity of change in world events and 
under the forbidding cloud of the nuclear threat, I can only agree with 
Theodore Rooseve lt that: 
"It wou ld be a benighted policy in such event to 
disqualify absolutely from the highest office a man who 
while holding it had actually shown the highest 
capacity to exercise its power with the utmost effect 
for public defense . If, for instance, a tremendous 
crisis occurred at the end of his first term , it would 
be a veritable calamity if the American people were 
forbidden to continue to use the services of the one 
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man whom they knew, and did not merely guess 
could carry them through the crisis." 
I therefore regret deeply that the traditional inhibition 
against a third term had been transformed into a constitutional prohibition. 
When a President is elected to his first term , we assume that he will seek 
reelection to a second. If he is reelected, the presumption that he will 
comply with the two-term tradition would probably prevail. Both he and 
we should have the option to continue him in office if circumstances so 
indicate . Given the demands on a President and the years of experience 
required to qualify him, more than eight years of service should remain 
the exception , on humane as well as political grounds. But I regard 
a rigid constitutional limit as unwise. Indeed, i.t verges on a vote of no 
confidence in democracy . To prohibit even one renewal would be even 
less desirable . It seems a curious reversal of logic to trust the American 
public to make an intelligent choice of a man who has never served as 
·president , but to rule that they can't be trusted to decide on the basis of 
his record whether he should be reelected. 
I turn now to the contention that a single six-year t erm 
would free the President from the pressures of party politics . I must say 
that I regard this as neither practical nor desirable. Under our two-party 
system , which I believe well serves the interests of a country as large 
and as heterogeneous as our own, most Presidents will have risen to 
prominence through the partisan political proc_ess. With rare exceptions , 
they will previously have held elec tive office. They will , and I believe 
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it is a healthy fact , owe som'e continued allegiance to the party which 
propelled them to the highest office our nation can award. 
But as long as we have political parties, no President can 
hope to be free from political attack , whether or not he is free to run for 
reelection. The party out of power will continue to be critical , to be 
partisan and even at times to be unfair. The opposition party objective 
i s not just to remove an i ndividual but to substitute a President of its 
own political persuasion. I regard it as unrealistic to expect that a 
party which has lost the presidency will be significantly more indulgent 
to the victor because he cannot be a candidate again . 
Instead , I would expect that the restriction of a President to 
a single term would lessen his political support rather than the amount of 
political attack . A President , to be effective , needs all the support he 
can get. He requires the confidence and the sympathy of the American 
public. He requires the cooperation of Congressmen and Senators on 
both sides of the uisle. But he certainly can hope to accomplish little 
unless he has the active and willing support of most members of his own 
party . 
Our politica l parties are not subject to the rigid discipline 
that exists in some countries , particularly those with a parliamentary 
form of government . But the Senators and Congressmen politically aligned 
with the Presi.dent are the most responsive means by which he can enact 
and implement hi.s programs . 
Without help and support from his party , presidential power 
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becomes very limited and formal , demonstrable for the most part in 
negative ways -- by vetoes , resistance to refonn and opposition to the 
new ideas of others. O nly the politically talented leader , sensitive to 
the politica l currents of th e day and in close a lliance with political 
leaders in and out of Washington can forge the necessary coalitions that 
can get things done. 
President Harry S. Truman made the point with his customary 
cogency before t his Subcommittee some twelve years ago in criticiz ing 
the Twenty-Second Amendment. He said : 
"The welfare , not only of this country , but of the whole 
world, depends on how effectively the duties of this 
office can be discharged. The job is an almost impossible 
one under any circumstances -- the man who holds it 
n eeds a ll the prestige , all the position of leadership , 
that is possible for him to have. 
"You do not have to be very smart to know that an 
officeholder who is not eligibl e for reelection loses 
a lot of i nfluence . So what have you done? You 
have taken a man and put him i n the hardest job in 
the world , and sent him out to fight our battles in a 
life-and-death struggle -- and you have sent him out 
to fight with one hand tied behind his back , because 
everyone knows he cannot run for reelection . 
"It makes no sense to treat a President this ·way -- no 
ma tter who he i s -- Republican or Democrat. He i s 
still President of the whole country , and all of us are 
dependent on him; and we ought to give him the tools 
to do his job." 
· I would agree with my old Chief that the Twenty-Second 
Am endment seriously erodes a President ' s power during his second term . 
The substitution of an even tighte r limit on presjdential tenure such as 
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Resolution 7 7 would handicap him from his first day in office . He , 
of course, would retain the full legal powers vested i.n him by t he 
Constitution and laws of the United States. But he has lost a significant 
degree of political power and , in a governmental system chracterized by 
two powerful political parties , this is an important ingredient in 
presidential effectiveness . 
A President who can never again be a candidate is a 
President whose codttails are permanently in mothballs. Those of his 
party in the Congress and in the states will of course retain an interest 
i n the building of a good record of party accomplishments , but his personal 
bargaining position is nonetheless seriously weakened . The other strong 
political figures in his party may continue to look to him as their leader--
but many will also see him primarily as their predecessor . 
The politica l disadvantage of a fixed and unrenewable term 
will also show its effects within the Executive Branch itself. A President'~ 
ability to make his mark on our vast and sprawling government derives 
primarily from his power to appoint. Through those whom he places in 
Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions, he tries to sec that the institutional 
i nertia of all l:l.rge organizations will not frustrate his programs and 
objectives. But in the waning years of a fixed and final term , it will 
become harder for a President to attract people of the caliber and competence 
he needs to help him operate a government of this size and complexity. 
The men and women best equipped for high poli.tical appointment are 
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nE:cessarily individuals already engaged in important and useful work. 
They are asked to disrupt their personal and professional lives , usually 
at significant financial sacrifice. They must compare these costs with 
the rewards of participation in matters of great public importance. When 
they recognize that the President whom they are asked to serve must 
himself be out of office within a year or two, they can hardly be blamed 
if they conclude that the price for so brief a period of govern:nent service 
is disproportionately high. 
Many of these difficulties obviously arc inherent in the 
present situation under the Twenty-Second Amendment. I believe that 
they would , however, be greatly increased by the substitution of a 
single six-year term in which the terminal date of a President's service 
is known from the time he is first elected. From the outset , no member of 
his party could look to him for support at the head of the ticket in future 
elections. He could never, as an incumbe nt President , accumulate the 
political credits that are the indispensable capital of a political leader. 
In seeking to free him from political pressures, we instead would deprive 
him of much of his political power . In my view, the trade-off would prove 
to be grossly uneven and undesirable. 
Nor can I sec any compensatin•J advantage in the assurance 
of a six-year term in place of a four-year minimum with the right to seek 
reelection. The additional two years assuruncc would do little, as I 
sec it, to improve the quality of prcsidentiul decision making. Nor 
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would they make a President more successful in carrying out his programs 
and ideas. He might have more time , but if his programs and ideas have 
popular appeal , he would in fact have less. And if I am correct in my 
judgment , political power is a more important factor than an incremental 
gain in time for canying out presidential programs. Moreover, the 
certainty that a President can continue in office for no more than six 
years might create more pressures on him for political compromise . All 
Presidents are deeply conscious of history and concerned for their place 
in it. As their one and only term runs on and out , the urge to leave some 
record of accomplishment could lead to less rather than better considered 
action. 
Finally, even if it were feasible to take the presidency out 
of politics, and even if it were realistic to expect a President to operate 
effectively with severly diminished political power, I don't believe 
the man in the White House should be insulated from political factors . 
Those circumstances would , as I see it, pose a far greater threat of 
abuse of executive power than that presented by reelection to three or 
more terms. A President immunized from political considerations is a 
President who need not listen to the people , respond to majority sentiment , 
or pay attention to views that may be diverse , intense and perhaps at 
varianr::e with his own . The necessHy to face an electorate in the future 
can lead to reconsideration of polici•'; s that may be both unpopular and 
unwise. Concern for one ' s own politica l future can be a powerful stimulus 
to responsible and responsive performance i n office. 
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Most of our Presidents have been politicians. Those who 
were not 1 and who were successful/ became politicians. Politics does 
no t always enjoy a good name. But politics 1 in the fina l ana lysis I is 
an essential part of democracy. A President above politics is a President 
remote from the processes of government and removed from the thoughts 
and aspirations of his p eople. 
The objective of constitutional reform, as I s a id at the 
beginning of my statement , should be to attract the best leadership and 
i mprove the ability of such l eaders to perform at their greatest effective-
ness . It is my firm conviction that the imposition of a rigid restriction 
on presidentia l tenure is inconsistent with tha t objective . Accordingly , 
I have regarded and continue to regard the Twenty-Second Amendment 
as unwis e in conception and unfortunate in operation . It should be 
repealed . I believe strongly tha t the imposition of a further restriction on 
a President's term of service would do even greater damage to the presidency 
as an institution. 
No such restriction is necessary to preserve our freedom 
from executive domination . No such restriction would ward off partisan 
politica l attack. By diminishing the President ' s political power , it would 
impede his ability to carry out his programs and operate the Executive Branch . 
A presidency divorced from politics would , ·even if achievable , 
be a presidency far different from tha t we have known . A President above 
-politics w';luld , I beli.eve , be a President. beyond popular reach and without 
popular appeal. We would be d eprived of a vital driving force for progress , 
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for change , for reconciliation of conflicting social forces . We would 
have instead a gray and impersonal concept with the President as a sort 
of 11 country manager . 11 
In a time of great change , great dangers and great opportun-· 
ities , I believe that this drastic revision i n the nature of the presidency 
would constitute a serious disservice to our country and to the world . 
More than ever before , this republic needs to maintain the 
strength and influence of the office of the Presidency . In my opinion , 
this i s best accomplished by refusing to add new restrictions on the term 
of the office , and by eliminating thos e that now exist. 
For a President to have the leverage that he needs , there 
should be generul acce ptance of the concept that a newly elected 
President might well be reelected to a second term , and if there is a 
second t erm , then t he possibility should exist that , ur1der unusual 
circumstances , h e might be elected to a third term . 
I do not see danger i n this concept of a President' s ability 
to perform hi s duties with a high degree of effectiveness. I have abiding 
confidence in our system of checks and balances. Our basic strength, 
and our continuing protection against excessive executive power , lies in 
the division of powers among the three co-equal branches , consisting of 
a strong executive , an inte lligent and vi.gorous Congress ,· and an i ndependent 
judiciary . 
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·. 
Oct ober 28 , 1971 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD 
BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS 
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: 
I appreciate very much having this opportunity to appear before 
you. I welcome the chance to express at the outset of these hearings 
my views pertaining to the proposed Constitutional Amendment that 
would limit the Presidency to a single term of six years. I am 
~--- r~ M cJ..<v..-~ ~? 
particularly proud and pleased to joinUwith the distinguished Senator 
from Vermont {Mr. Aiken) in this endeavor which I personally regard 
as one of the most important reforms that our system of government 
could undergo. 
In recent years there have been a number of significant amendmentf 
to the Constitution of the United States--for which you, Mr. Chairman, 
and Members of this Subcommittee may take a great share of credit. 
Correcting the matter of Presidential succession and particularly 
extending the franchise of the ballot to young adults 18, 19 and 20 
years of age represent enormous steps forward; steps that protect 
and enhance immensely the Democratic processes of this Nation. In 
my judgment there is still another step that must be taken in this 
area of Constitutional evolution. It is only in providing a single 
Presidential term of six years, I believe, that this Nation will 
preserve for its highest office a sufficient degree of freedom and 
independence to function properly and adequately today and in the 
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years ahead; years that will produce enormous trials and tens i ons 
on the national and global scale, some of which have yet to emerge. 
By no means do I intend to imply that with this proposed amend-
ment new ground is being broken or that a topic of first impression 
is here being raised. Indeed, the suggestion of a single six year 
term has been with us ever since the delegates to the Constitutional 
convention of 1787 thrased over the question of a President's term 
and his eligibility for re-election. It is interesting to note that 
popular election was not considered with any great favor at all 
during the proceedings of that convention. But proposals limiting 
the tenure of the President were put forth and discussed. Ultimately 
none were approved and the question then became moot when the sug-
gestion for an electoral college system gained the widest support. 
Since the Constitution was ratified hundreds of amendments have 
been introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives proposing 
a change in Presidential tenure. More than 130 of these recommended 
a single term of six years. Twice, the House reported legislation 
~roviding for the six-year term. And in 1913, the Senate passed 
S.J. Res. 78 calling for a term of six years, but no action was 
taken by the other body. Presidents themselves have been most 
I 
active in their support for the concept. Nearly 150 years ago 
Andrew Jackson recommended that the electoral college be abolished--
also a good suggestion--that the President be elected by direct 
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vote, and that he be limited to a single term of either four or 
six years. Presidents Hayes and Cleveland and William Howard 
Taft also offered the proposal. In more recent years on this issue 
I have followed the lead of the able and distinguished Senator 
from Vermont (Mr. Aiken), the dean of the Republicans and a wise 
and prudent judge on all matters and particularly on those affecting 
the needs of democratic institutions in a rapidly changing world. 
That brings us up to today, Mr. Chairman, and I must say- that the 
merits of the proposal dictate its need now as never before. 
It is just intolerable that a President of the United States--
any President, whatever his party--is compelled to devote his time, 
energy and talents to what can be termed only as purely political 
tasks. I do not refer .. · solely to a President's own re-election 
campaign. To be sure a re-election effort and all it entails are 
burdens enough. But a President facing re-election faces as well 
a host of demands that range from.-,attending the rieeds of political 
I 
office holders, office seekers, financial backers and all the rest 
to riding herd on the day-to-day developments within the pedestrian 
partisan arena. Surely this amendment does not represent a panace~ 
£or these ills which have grown up with our system of democracy. 
But it would go far, I think, in unsaddling the Presidency from 
many of these unnecessary political burdens that an incumbent bears. 
Clearly such a change to a very great extent would free the 
•• t, 
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President to devote a far greater measure of his time to the enor-
mous task of serving all of the people of this Nation as Chief 
Executive. More time would thus be provided for policy-making 
and policy-implementing, for program-initiating and for shaping 
and directing the kind of Administration a President chooses. More 
time would be provided for the kind of experimentation that a 
sucqessful Presidency requires; such experimentation has come too 
infrequently in recent years, and as a Nation we suffer from that 
inadequacy. 
In short, six full years could be devoted to the job of the 
Presidency, in and of itself, a complicated and gigantic responsi-
bility. Six years could be devoted, free of the burdens of seeking--
a~ 
however unavoidably--partisan political objectivesAfree of any 
potential conflicts inherent in such endeavors. 
There is another aspect to this problem of re-election and 
it concerns not an incumbent President but rather those of the 
opposition; those who seek to gain the White House for their .own. 
Certainly there is a great deal of room for constructive criticism, 
be it partisan or of whatever nature. Criticism is fundamental to 
our success as a Nation. It is what distinguishes us most as a free 
and open society. But there is another sort of criticism that a 
first term President must face at times and no President can give 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 47, Folder 72, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
-5-
his fullest attention to the country so long as he is barraged and 
fired upon by those who do not offer constructive advice and alterna-
tives but who would instead hope only to weaken an incumbent's 
chances for re~election. The effect of such vituperation when resort-
ed to is just as invidious to the present two-term system as when 
an incumbent for similar partisan reasons puts political expediency 
before the Nation's interest. The President should be free to con-
centrate completely on his responsibilities. Electing him to a single 
term of six years, I think, would increase this-probability. 
And what of the arguments against this proposition? One raises 
the lame duck issue. The argument goes that when a President is 
elected for a single term of six years, he immediately becomes a 
lame duek. But the same is true today as soon as a President has 
been re-elected to a second term. The Twenty-second Amendment saw 
to that. But it is really no argument at all. Lameness by no means 
is inherent in a single term. It relates in my judgmen't to the 
) 
strength and quality of the man holding the office7 should he be 
a lame duck President it is not because of any inhibitions imposed 
by a single term. An unlimited number of terms would not sustain such 
a man. On the other hand, a President who rises to his responsibili-
ties will have sufficient opportunity to organize an effective and 
successful Administration given a six year term to do so. Six years 
in office is sufficient time to effectuate all such policy aims 
,. 
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a newly-elected President entertains. 
Conversely, six years is also long enough for one man to 
endure in a position filled with the pressures and tensions, the 
worries and responsibilities of the Presidency of the United States. 
Adding to them, the stresses and strains of a re-election campaign 
simply makes no sense today. There are additional reasons, Mr. 
Chairman, With a single six year term, gone would be the charge, 
however invalid, that a President uses his power to appoint to achieve 
political ends and to pave the way for his re-election. For that 
cl-c.·c:./;;;::.n s 
matte~gone too would be the argument that Ga~~ of foreign 
policy, of economics and whatever wou~ be politically motivated. 
Then there is the matter of election costs. The price of a 
Presidential campaign today has skyrocketed beyond reason. Should 
the trend continue what is faced every four years in terms of 
financial burdens can only lead to the financial ruin of one or 
more of our national parties. Spreading that financial strain 
to six year intervals should certainly ease some of the burden. Not 
.) 
to mention easing the burden that the electorate is compelled to 
undergo every four years. I think it would be welcome news in every 
household that the drawn out and tiresome events of national con-
ventions and Presidential campaigns would at least occur with less 
frequency. 
... 
To sum it up, Mr. chairman, what this amendment seeks is to 
' '· 
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place the office of the Presidency in a position that transcends 
as much as possible partisan political considerations of whatever 
nature and source. That it cannot do the job completely, I would 
agree. The man who achieves the office carries with him his full 
political heritage. But its adoption would do much, I think, to 
streamline the Presidency in a manner that ultimately will make the 
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